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FEBRUARY 28, 1823 
Daniel Webster was undoubtedly at ease when he walked through the 
short hallway leading to the United States Supreme Court chamber, then 
in the basement of the Capitol. There were, after all, several reasons for 
serenity as the forty-one-year-old lawyer-politician arrived to h«ar the 
Court's decision regarding Indian land rights inJohnson and Graham's Les-
see v. McIntosh . 
First of all, he was in familiar surroundings. Prior to Johnson, Webster 
had appeared in thirty-one cases before the Court. His fust three Supreme 
Court cases had been argued in this room, located beneath the Senate 
chamber. When the British burned the Capitol in 1814, the Court had 
been compelled to meet elsewhere, including a cramped committee room 
described as "little better than a dungeon." Webster argued eight times 
there, including the case that gave him a national reputation: Dartmouth 
College v. Woodward. 
Since February 1819, however, Webster had exhibited his oratorical 
skills in the courtroom he was now entering. The prominent architect 
Benjamin Latrobe had rebuilt the low-arched vaulted ceiling, which was 
supported by massive pillars. The slightly elevated mahogany desks of the 
seven justices were situated below three windows on the east wall, which 
provided insufficient light. In the back of the semicircular room was the 
plaster relief Justice, portraying a woman holding scales and a sword. To 
some observers, the room was splendid; to others, it had a "cellar-like 
aspect." One visitor remarked that Justice lacked the traditional blindfold 
because "it was too dark for her to see anyway." I 
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Old upremc oun C hamber in th e bascmcnt orthc United t3te 
Jantze n, oJl cc ti on of ch e Supreme Court orthc United States. 
Webster's preemin ent sta tu s was the second reason for hi s calm de-
meanor as he watched the justices don their black gowns. To be sure, 
th ere was a g r at deal at stake in this case. Johnson, Graham, and the other 
shareholders of th e Illinois and Wabash Land Company were asking the 
Supreme Court to uphold private purchases, made in 1773 and 1775, of 
immense tracts ofIndian land. On the eve of oral arguments, a lawyer for 
McIntosh exclaimed at a White House dinn er th at "seventlyJ millions of 
acres of land are in controversy.,,2 Yet no constitutiona l provision was at 
issue, not th e ontract C lause, as in Dartmollth College, or the N ecessary 
and Proper lau e, a in NlcCu lloch II. Nlaryland. An unfavorable decision in 
J ohllson v. Nlclnfosh would not affect Webster's position as the unquestioned 
head of th e Supreme Coun bar. 
N evertheless, th e Massac husetts congressman had don e his best in 
a diffi cult case . On Saturday, February 15 , Webster had endeavo red to 
c l1Vince th e five justi ces prese nt- John M arshall, William Johnson , 
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Brockholst Livingston, Gabriel Duvall, and Joseph Story-that the Indians 
had lawfully deeded the lands at issue. According to one observer, George 
Rodney of Delaware, Webster "went into a discu ssion upon the origin 
of property and managed it skilfully for a bad cause." Rodney surmised 
that the Court "will doubtless [bel against the grant." Edward Ingersoll, a 
shareholder in the Illinois and Wabash Land Company, expressed his de-
sire "to sell for present profits, [as] I calculate on an unfavorable decision.") 
Webster settled himself as M arshall prepared to deliver the opinion. 
Two Supreme Courtjustices-Bushrod Washington and Thomas Todd-
had not participated in the case. Ju stice Story had been absent on the 
third day of arguments, either "frotTl indisposition or ill will."" Webster 
opened for the plaintiffs, and his co-counsel, Robert Goodloe Harper 
of Baltimore, concluded the case . Henry Murray and William Winder 
represented McIntosh. Both counsel and the audience awaited the Court's 
decision. There were no Indians in attendance. 
John M arshall, age forty-seven , a Federalist from Virginia and a propo-
nent of a strong national government, began as follows: "The plaintiffs in 
this cause claim the land .. . under two grants ... by the chiefs of certain 
Indian tribes, constituting the Illinois and th e Piankeshaw nations; and 
the question is , whether this title can be recognised in the Courts of the 
United States?" The chief ju stice then proceeded to address the source 
of law that would govern the Court's decision: "It will be necessa ry . . . 
to examine, not singly those principles of abstract justice . .. ; but those 
principles also which our own government has adopted in the particular case, 
and given us as the rule for our decision." 
This did not sound promising. The rights of Indians to own property 
and to transfer title were natural rights in the vi ew of the plaintiffs, based 
on the principles of "abstract justice" that Marshall was subordinating to 
the principles "our own government has adopted." But which principles 
did Marshall have in mind? The chief justice chose to emphasize the right 
of discovery: "This principle was, that discovery gave title to the governJ11.ent 
by whose subjects, or by whose authority, it was made, against all other 
European governm.ents, which title might be consummated by posses-
sion . ... Those relations which were to exist between the discoverer and 
the natives, were to be regulated by them.selves." 
Webster was familiar with M arshall 's circuitous reasonin g. After de-
claring as determinative the principle adopted by the government, Mar-
shall turned to the doctrine of discovery-a doctrine of international law 
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that gave the di covering nation rights "against all other European gov-
ernments." International law, however, should not have determined the 
validity of the deeds held by the Illinois and Wabash Land Company, 
a Marshall seemingly acknowledged when he tated that the relations 
between the discoverer and the Natives "were to be regulated by them-
selves." Mar hall had come full circle, but he had not yet provided the 
an wer. Would the upreme ourt uphold the Illinois-Wabash purchase? 
In the following passage, Marshall denied the right of Indians to convey 
legal title to the lands they occupy: 
They were admitted to be the rightful occupants of the soil, with a legal as 
well a ju t claim to retain pos es ion of it, ... but their rights to complete 
sovereignty, as independent nations, were neces arily diminished, and their 
pOllJer to dispose of the soil at their OUlII ,viII, to whomsocver they pleased, "'as del1ied 
by the ori,Rillal frmdalllelltal prillciple, that discovery gave eXc/lisive title to those who 
//lade it. 5 
Although eighty-two paragraph were to follow, the fundamental ques-
tion was answered: the 1773 and 1775 ales were invalid. The United 
States, in sub equent treaties, obtained a complete title to the lands at issue, 
which was thereafter tran ferred to William McIntosh. The shares in the 
Illinois and Wabash Land Company were worthless. 
The outcome in Johnsoll II. McIntosh most likely did not upset Daniel 
Web ter, who made no mention of the decision in bis correspondence. 
After fulfilling his role, Webster lost interest in the proceedings. During 
the next day' argument he sent John Quincy Adams an extract of a let-
ter stating that Adam "is gaining fa t upon the affections of the people.,,6 
Thus, while the fate of the Illinois and Wabash Land Company was before 
the ourt, the outcome of the 1824 election was on the mind of Daniel 
Webster. 
Robert Goodloe Harper was al 0 on familiar ground as he listened glumly 
to Marshall's depiction of land law in America" from its di covery to the 
present day." The flfty-eight-year-old elder statesman of the Federalist Party 
had appeared in more Supreme Court cases than any other person between 
1800 and 1815 and was con idered one of the great lawyers of the era. Most 
notably, Harper had successfully contended, in Fletcher II. Peck, that a Geor-
gia tatute had impaired vested property rights in violation of the Contract 
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Clause. Typically dressed in a dark blue outercoat, buff waistcoat, and pol-
ished boots, Harper was viewed by many as a "dandy in dress" and "in some 
degree artificial.,,7 At the same time, contemporaries praised him as a gifted 
debater who possessed a first-rate command of the law. 
Harper, like Webster, would end the day with his reputation intact. As 
the chief justice exclaimed that the 1763 Royal Proclamation constituted 
"an additional objection to the title of the plaintiffs," Harper n'lay have 
reacted by reflecting on his military, political, and legal careers. At age 
sixteen, he had served during the Revolution under General Nathaniel 
Greene. When the British attacked Baltimore in 1814, Harper was "in the 
hottest of the fight" and commanded troops in the battle at North Point. 
At this time he attained the rank of major-general and was customarily ad-
dressed as "General Harper" for the rest of his life. 
His political career had two phases, beginning as a Republican from 
South Carolina and ending as a Federalist from Maryland. From 1794 
until 1801 Harper served as chairman of the House Committee of Ways 
and Means, supported the alien and sedition laws, and voted for Aaron 
Burr in the election of 1800. After moving to Baltimore, Harper was 
elected to the Senate in 1816, but he served less than a year due to the 
press of private concerns, not least his role in the Illinois and Wabash Land 
Company. In both 1816 and 1820 he received consideration as the Federal-
ist candida te for vice president. 8 
Harper's legal career blossomed in Baltimore, where he opened a law of-
fice in 1799. Aside from Fletcher iJ. Peck, Harper's most celebrated achieve-
ment was his speech of seven hours made during the 1805 impeachment 
trial of Justice Samuel Chase. His abilities were unquestioned, and Edward 
Ingersoll informed a fellow shareholder that Harper's argument in Johnson 
"has been everything that cou ld be desired; full, powerful and elegant.,,9 
No one would dispute that Harper, like his co-counsel Daniel Webster, 
had done his best under discouraging circumstances. 
There was one critical difference, however, between the two men: 
Robert Goodloe Harper was a shareholder in the Illinois-Wabash Land 
Company. As a young man Harper had developed an interest in western 
lands and invested in several unsuccessful ventures. For the remainder of 
his life the desire for wealth and the harsh reality of debt were constant 
companions. By retiring from Congress and moving to Baltimore, he 
had hoped not only to establish a lucrative law practice but also to wed 
Catherine Carroll, the daughter of one of the richest men in America. lo 
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Charles Carroll of Ca rrolltol1 initially opposed the match but eventually 
consented. During the course of their marriage "Kitty" received eighty-
seven thousand dollars from her father, yet her husband had outstanding 
single debts as large as ten thousand dollars. 11 
The Illinoi -Wabash purchase beckoned as the mean to a lavish, debt-
free life tyle. The primary investors were from Pennsylvania and Mary-
land, the two states where Harper had spent much of his adult life. In the 
1790s he met Robert Morris and John Nicholson of Philadelphia, w ho 
both purchased share in the Illinois and Wabash venture. He may also 
have had dealings with Supreme CourtJusticeJames Wi lson, who erved 
as the company' president. Harper's ubseguent involvement with the 
Illinois-Wabash purchase wa likely sparked by the presence in Maryland 
of his father-in-law and other prominent shareholders, such as Governor 
Thoma Johnson and Supreme Court Ju tice Samuel Chase. By the time 
he argued Flefcller v. Peck in L809, Robert Goodloe Harper was spearhead-
ing efforts to obtain con firmation of the 1773 and 1775 ales. 
Perhaps his ambitious nature caused Harper to overlook the fact that 
the company' claims had been repeatedly rejected for over forty years. 
Harper himself crafted memorials in J 810 and 1816 that failed to persuade 
Congress. Only one alternative remained: litigation in the federa l COurts. 
When Illinois tatehood in 1818 wa followed by the death of Thomas 
Johnson in 1819, the final option was at hand. Largely stage-managed by 
Harper, litigation wa commenced by Johnson's heirs in order to confirm 
their right to lands purchased in 1775 from the Piankeshaws. 
Because the stakes were so high, and possible fortu nes so immense, 
Harper and his fellow shareholders cOllvinced themselves that they had a 
chance. Harper maintained in 1810 that the claim "can be sustained in a 
court of Law," and a shareholder noted in 1811 that "Mr. Harper is as san-
guine as a rea onable person can probably be." Three days after oral argu-
ments concluded, Harper ignored preva iling sentiment and discussed the 
measures to be taken "should we obtain a favourable deci i011.,,12 On Fri-
day, February 28, 1823, in the basement chamber of the Supreme ourt, 
Robert Goodloe Harper finally realized there would not be "a favourable 
decision" in the matter of the Illinois-Wabash pu rchase. 
Johllsoll v. McIlltosh offers divergent rationales for its conclusion that Indians 
are l11.ere Occupants of thei r lands and thus" incapable of transferring the 
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absolute title to others." Marshall vacillates between discovery (" discovery 
gave exclusive title") and conquest (conquest "gives a title which the courts 
of the conqueror cannot deny"), yet acknowledges the "pretension of con-
verting the discovery of an inhabited country into conquest." 13 The Court 
also concludes that the Virginia "sea to sea" royal charter and the 1763 
Royal Proclam.ation divested the Illinois and Piankeshaws of their rights 
of proprietorship.'4 On one hand, Marshall defends the result as supported 
by the "character and habits" of the Natives, the "superior genius" of the 
Europeans, and the "soundest principles of wisdom and national policy."'S 
On the other hand, he views the matter as a fait accompli, declaring that 
"however this restriction may be opposed to natural right, and to the us-
ages of civilized nations, yet, if it be indispensable to that system under 
which the country has been settled, and be adapted to the actual condition 
of the two people, it may, perhaps, be supported by reason, and certainly cannot 
be rejected by Courts ofjustice.,,'6 
Given such conflicting signals, it is not surprising that Johnson has been 
characterized as "one of the most misunderstood cases in the Anglo-
American law." Although the decision has been defended as "a brilliant 
compromise" that "poses little or no restriction on the tribes," most 
commentators have criticized Johnson II. Mclntosh and its endorsement of 
the doctrine of discovery. Robert Williams, Jr., characterizes Marshall's 
opinion as an "abusive, anachronistic and racist vision of Indian status 
and rights." Steven Newcomb posits that Johnson was premised on "a dis-
tinction between paramount rights of 'Christian people' and subordinate 
rights of 'heathens' or non-Christians." The Supreme Court's adoption of 
the doctrine of discovery, Lindsay Robertson points out, "led to political 
catastrophe for Native Americans.,,'7 
Maurice Baxter, a biographer of Daniel Webster, characterizes Johnson 
11. McIntosh as "a hopeless case from the beginning," and describes the 
legal dispute as follows: "Did the Indians have such a title to their lands 
that they could sell to private individuals? And if so, was the sale legal in 
the face of the British Proclamation of 1763 and of subsequent Virginia 
legislation prohibiting these transactions? Webster elaborately maintained 
the affirmative to both questions. But the whole history of In.dian relations was 
against him, and a decision in his favor would have caused a more chaotic situation 
than one could imagl:ne.,,'8 Baxter overstates Webster's role. For Daniel Web-
ster, Johnson was just another case, a chance to earn a fee. It was not one 
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of the cases that defined him as the "Defender of the Constitution." The 
legal positions Webster "elaborately maintained" before the Court were 
based on arguments and theories that were crafted by others. 
For Robert Goodloe Harper, however, Johnson v. McIntosh was not just 
another case: it represented the culmination of years of effort to con-
firm-and profit from-the I11inois-Wabash purchase. Harper devoted a 
considerable portion of his legal career to the issue of Indian land rights. 
His efforts, of course, were not expended on behalf of Indian tribes but 
rather for the benefit of private speculators who purchased Indian lands. 
For John Marshall, the litigation provided an opportunity to legitimize 
the process ofland acquisition in the United States. Marshall's opinion de-
fies succinct appraisal, but the central message of Johnson v. McIntosh is that 
"discovery" divested Indians of "their power to dispose of the soil at their 
own will, to whomsoever they pleased." Baxter asserts that "the whole 
history ofIndian relations" led inexorably to this result, and Marshall jus-
tifted his holding on the basis of "the actual condition of the two people.,,19 
These statements are misleading: actual practices varied regarding the sale 
of Indian lands to private individuals, and the result in Johnson-while 
predictable-was not foreordained. 
For the I11inois and Piankeshaw Indians, the result in Johnson had no 
direct impact. The tribes had twice sold their rights to the lands at issue; 
first by private sale, second by treaty. On February 28, 1823, the Illinois 
and Piankeshaws no longer inhabited their historic homelands. They had 
been removed to Missouri and would be removed again, to Kansas, and 
ultimately to the Indian Territory. In the process their separate identities 
were lost; but their descendants-now members of the Peoria Tribe of 
Oklahoma-remain. 
For all Indians, the legacy of Johnson. v. McIntosh continues to have a 
significant impact. The litigation is inextricably connected to the prevail-
ing legal view of Native land rights in America. The right of Indians to 
their lands-to possess, use, exclude, own, and sell- was "one of the most 
intensely contested issues in the life of the early Republic.,,2o The historical 
process of buying America from the Indians has been largely concluded, 
but the legitimacy of America's conception ofIndian land rights persists as 
one of the most important issues in Indian country and federal Indian law. 
